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ABSTRACT 
Discussion includes recent enhancements to the BUMPER-II program and input files in support of Shuttle 
Return to Flight. Improvements to the mesh definitions of the finite element input model will be 
presented. A BUMPER-II analysis process that was used to estimate statistical uncertainty is introduced.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
BUMPER-II is an MMOD risk analysis program 
originally developed by for the Space Station 
Freedom Program. Over the years, the 
capabilities of this engineering analysis tool 
have been extended to include the Space Shuttle 
Orbiter, the International Space Station (ISS) 
and many other spacecraft. When provided with 
a vehicle shape, orbit parameters and applicable 
ballistic limit equations with defined failure 
criteria, the BUMPER-II code will calculate the 
MMOD risk for spacecraft in low Earth orbit 
against a variety of natural and man-made 
environments. Thousands of hypervelocity 
impact tests have been performed on 
representative samples of ISS shields and 
subsystems, Shuttle thermal protection system 
(TPS) materials [1], Extravehicular Mobility 
Unit (EMU) materials [2] and other spacecraft 
components to determine MMOD impact 
parameters at the failure limits of the various 
subsystems. BUMPER is used to calculate 
MMOD impact risks to specific Orbiter surfaces. 
An integrated mission assessment is completed 
using Poisson statistics and knowledge of the 
distribution of times spent in each unique 
Orbiter attitude [3]. 
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Fig. 1: BUMPER-II functional overview. 
 
FAILURE CRITERIA UPDATES 
As part of the Shuttle Return-to-Flight effort, the 
NASA Johnson Space Center’s Hypervelocity 
Impact Technology Facility performed 
hypervelocity impact testing and analysis of 
Shuttle wing leading-edge (WLE) reinforced 
carbon-carbon (RCC) test samples to update 
WLE threshold failure criteria [4]. After the 
hypervelocity impact tests, the samples were 
exposed to typical reentry heating conditions at 
the NASA JSC Arc-Jet (AJ) Facility to 
determine the extent of heating induced damage 
growth. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20060047566 2019-08-29T23:48:08+00:00Z
 
Fig. 2: 0.8 mm aluminum HVI/AJ RCC test results. 
 
It was found from the HVI/AJ testing that non-
penetrating pits would lead to burn-through in 
some areas of the WLE where burn-through can 
lead to loss-of-vehicle (LOV) during reentry.  
Figure 2 shows the resulting damage caused by a 
0.8 mm diameter aluminum hypervelocity 
impactor and subsequent damage growth due to 
AJ testing. For STS-107 and previous missions, 
WLE failure threshold consisted of 1 inch 
diameter allowable hole sizes in RCC on the 
upper surface and ¼ in. hole size on the lower 
surface. The results of the recent RCC/AJ testing 
indicated that the WLE failure criteria for LOV 
should be reduced for MMOD assessments on 
future missions. Figures 3 and 4 show the WLE 
and nose failure criteria maps before and after 
the recent changes. The reduction in allowable 
damage results in increased calculated MMOD 
risks for future missions [5]. 
 
Fig. 3: Pre-STS-107 RCC Failure Criteria Map. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Post-STS-107 RCC Failure Criteria Map. 
 
ORBITER/ISS MATED ATTITUDES 
The Shuttle and International Space Station 
(ISS) Programs have decreased MMOD impact 
risks to the orbiter by changing the orientation of 
the ISS while the shuttle is docked. The change 
in orientation – essentially flying the ISS 
“backwards” – provided incidental shielding to 
the shuttle as well as directing MMOD sensitive 
areas of the WLE and nose cap away from the 
majority of the MMOD particle flux. Figure 5 
shows the shuttle-ISS docked orientation change 
with respect to the ISS velocity direction. In 
previous ISS missions, the belly of the vehicle 
typically faced into the velocity direction of ISS 
motion and highest MMOD impact flux. The 
attitude change orients the bottom of the shuttle 
in the wake direction of ISS reducing MMOD 
impacts to the most vulnerable surfaces of the 
vehicle and improving crew safety and odds of 
mission success. 
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             Fig. 5: Shuttle-ISS mated attitudes before STS-107 (ISS +XVV) & after STS-107 (ISS -XVV). 
 
A trade study was performed to assess the 
quantitative effect of the ISS -XVV attitude 
change on the critical MMOD risk for the STS-
114 mission. The results of the mated attitude 
trade study are illustrated in figure 5. The ISS -
XVV mated attitude used for STS-114 increased 
the odds of MMOD critical penetration from “1 
in 78” to “1 in 151”, an overall mission risk 
reduction of nearly 2X. The bar chart in figure 6 
illustrates the qualitative effect of orbiter attitude 
on MMOD critical penetration risk using the 
RCC failure criteria shown in figure 4.  
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                Fig. 6: Critical MMOD risk as a function of orbiter attitude. 
Pre STS-107
Post STS-107
 
Fig. 7: WLE RCC finite element mesh. 
 
ORBITER FEM UPDATES 
Figure 7 shows a detail of the WLE RCC area of 
the orbiter that is represented by a detailed finite 
element mesh containing over 50,000 elements. 
Each color change represents a different failure 
criteria region. This mesh area has 592 distinct 
regions, where hypervelocity impact damage 
resistance is defined to reflect failure criteria and 
physical differences such as location, thickness, 
and material. [6] 
The Nose Cap/Chin Panel area of the orbiter was 
also revised and is now composed of nearly 
5000 elements. These newly revised mesh areas 
provide a significant increase in analytical detail, 
allowing property definition and risk 
calculations for specific regions of individual 
WLE components such as panels and seals. 
Figure 8 depicts the new finite element mesh in 
the nose cap/chin panel region of the Shuttle. 
 
Pre STS-107
Post STS-107
 
Fig. 8: Nose cap/chin panel finite element mesh. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESTIMATION OF UNCERTAINTY BOUNDS 
This section documents a proposed technique to 
estimate uncertainty bounds in BUMPER-II 
assessments of MMOD risk to the shuttle. A 
typical analysis is comprised of input scripts and 
data files for the Bumper program modules 
(Geometry, Response & Shield) that describe the 
input parameters for the mission. This 
architecture allows for multiple analysis cases to 
set up in a script through loop constructs. [7] 
 
Methodology 
The BUMPER-II code calculates an expected 
number of penetrations of a spacecraft based on 
a single set of program inputs. To estimate 
uncertainty bounds, multiple instances of the 
same calculation need to be run while varying 
selected environment and penetration input 
parameters. The “environment” variables for this 
study were MMOD flux and density, OD 
velocity distribution. Ballistic limit equations 
and failure criteria were selected as the 
“penetration” variables.  Figure 9 provides an 
outline of the risk assessment methodology used 
in this assessment. The upper “BUMPER Input” 
boxes describe the input phase for the analysis; 
the intermediate boxes indicate calculations and 
the lower box represents output processing. 
The first step in the analysis is the statistical 
modeling of selected input parameters. The input 
distribution definitions are used as directives to 
an external (i.e., not part of the Bumper code) 
statistical processor that generates randomly 
selected values of Bumper input parameters. The 
input parameter set is then copied into a 
BUMPER-II input file which runs the code once 
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Fig. 9: Risk assessment workflow. 
 
for each case in the parameter set. MMOD risk 
output values from the runs is tabulated and sent 
back to the statistics processor, where 
uncertainty bounds can be determined. The 
technique used in this analysis for the estimation 
of uncertainty bounds incorporates Bumper code 
input variables from the sensitivity analysis with 
the added complexity of allowing values in 
between the upper and lower bounds. Input 
distribution types chosen for each variable are 
provided in table 1.  
 
Probability Distribution Functions (PDF) 
A “discrete” distribution selects from a defined 
set of inputs while a “continuous” distribution 
can return any value between the limits. The 
uncertainty analysis uses a statistical 
preprocessor (@Risk v4.5) to select values for
 
Type Name
Distribution
Type PDF
Environment OD Flux Continuous Log Normal, μ=1.0 0.9 1.6
Environment MM Flux Continuous Log Normal, μ=1.0 0.5 2.0
Environment OD Velocity Discrete  --- 
Environment OD Density Continuous Log Normal, μ=2.8 1.0 7.9
Environment MM Denisty Continuous Log Normal, μ=1.0 0.5 1.9
Penetration MM/OD BLE Continuous Extreme Value, μ=1.0 0.9 1.15
Penetration MMOD Failure Criteria Discrete  --- Min, Base, Max
Limit Values
Min, Base, Max
 
        Table 1: Input distribution types. 
 
  
each of the Bumper inputs using the probability 
distribution functions (PDF) discussed below. 
The Log-normal PDF for OD and MM flux 
input are the only PDF’s with uncertainty values 
of 68% (±1 sigma) at the distribution limits.  
The other continuous distributions in this 
assessment were assumed to have 95% 
confidence bounds between parameter value 
extrema. MM and OD density Log Normal input 
distributions were modeled with 95% confidence 
bounds at the extrema and the mean set to the 
baseline analysis value (OD density = 2.8 g/cc 
and MM density = 1.0 g/cc).  
The discrete PDF for the OD velocity 
distribution was set to select the nominal 
ORDEM2000 orbital debris velocity distribution 
option twice as often as the equally likely 
minimum and maximum velocity distribution 
options. 
 The Penetration PDF’s used in the uncertainty 
analysis are correlated to shield penetration, so 
they were not modeled as separate distributions 
for meteoroids and orbital debris. An Extreme 
Value PDF was used to model the Ballistic 
Limit Equation (BLE) factor inputs, with a mean 
at the nominal analysis baseline of 1.0 and ~95% 
of the area between the analysis extrema of 0.9 
and 1.15. Three discrete options are modeled for 
failure criteria. The “max” and “min” options 
were assumed to be half as likely to occur as the 
“nominal” option.  
 
Assessment Parameters 
The following constants were used for the 
uncertainty calculations in BUMPER-II: 
OD Environnent  – ORDEM 2000 
MM Environnent – SSP-30425, Rev. B 
Year    – 2003 
Inclination   – 51.6° 
Altitude   – 400km 
 
Unmated  
Attitude   – RPY = 0°, 180°, 0°  
Exposure Time   – 3.125 days (29%) 
 
Mated  
Attitude   – RPY = 0°, 113°, 0°  
Exposure Time   – 7.625 days (71%) 
 
Figure 10 depicts the two finite element models 
that were used for the uncertainty assessment.   
1. Orbit Insert Æ Dock
3. Undock Æ Re-entry
VV
LV
Unmated Attitude – RPY=0°,180°,0°
Nose Aft, Bay Earth (3.125 Days)
Mated Attitude – RPY=0°,113°,0°
Nose Space, Bay Aft (7.625 Days)
VV
LV
2. DockÆ Undock
Fig. 10: BUMPER-II finite element models. 
 
Analysis Results 
Figure 11 shows the frequency plot of the 
MMOD critical risk output for the 180 cases in 
this analysis. Using @Risk, a probability 
distribution was fitted the output values. Figure 
12 shows the 90% uncertainty bounds on the 
example baseline analysis of 1 in 440 vary from 
a minimum of “1 in 114” to “1 in 2654”. 
 
 0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
38 439 841 1242 1643 2045 2446 2847 3249 3650 4051 4453 4854 More
Bin
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
 
Fig. 11: MMOD risk frequency plot. 
 
 
Bumper Uncertainty Analysis - Output Distribution
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Fig. 12: MMOD risk distribution. 
 
Forward Work 
The next version of the uncertainty analysis will 
support the updates to the orbiter finite element 
model documented in this paper. The failure 
criteria changes to the RCC wing leading edge 
and the nose cap areas significantly effects 
MMOD risk. Forward work includes updating 
the uncertainty assessment based on the new 
failure criteria as well as reflecting the latest 
changes in uncertainty ranges of key risk 
assessment parameters Additional research into 
the parameters used in the input PDF’s may also 
be desirable. 
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